{"id":57640,"date":"2026-07-06T10:50:58","date_gmt":"2026-07-06T10:50:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/?post_type=legal_developments&#038;p=57640"},"modified":"2026-07-06T10:50:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-06T10:50:58","slug":"ai-deepfakes-and-the-discrediting-of-evidence-that-was-previously-indisputable","status":"publish","type":"legal_developments","link":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/thought-leadership\/ai-deepfakes-and-the-discrediting-of-evidence-that-was-previously-indisputable\/","title":{"rendered":"AI, deepfakes, and the discrediting of evidence that was previously indisputable"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Authored by Noemi C\u0103dariu, Managing Associate<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sure, ChatGPT writes our emails, drafts our LinkedIn posts, translates documents, and generates content that substantially reduces the time spent on a single task. The widespread adoption and normalization of artificial intelligence in our daily lives\u2014both at work and at home\u2014creates even more room for error, as we place blind trust in content generated without citing sources, in a format that\u2019s easy to take \u201cas is,\u201d instantly translated into any language, created by software capable of sensing or reading its audience (in the term <em>\u201csentient<\/em>,\u201d which is difficult to translate).<\/strong><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, we wish to highlight the ease with which the end user of a piece of material, document, result, or response can be <em>misled<\/em>\u2014how do we distinguish between an AI-generated response and one provided by a competent person who knows their field? How do we distinguish between an author\u2019s manuscript and a text generated by AI that has learned their writing style? How do we distinguish a lawyer\u2019s legal opinion from one written by AI with access to legislation? After all, both come with a disclaimer.<\/p>\n<p>How do we manage, at the end of the day, to actually recognize the human factor?<\/p>\n<p>We are aware of the obvious downside to the daily benefits that artificial intelligence brings in automating and streamlining tasks: <em>the laziness <\/em>of the human mind, both from an active perspective\u2014by shifting active components of a project onto the AI \u2014as well as from a passive perspective\u2014by easily and quickly obtaining information perceived as truth but never verified.<\/p>\n<p>But what are we doing about the neglected phenomenon of <em>deepfakes<\/em>? We smile when artificial intelligence generates content favorable to us, losing sight of the fact that there are always two sides to every coin, and that AI content\u2014being in constant development\u2014can at any time generate content that is completely unfavorable to humans (individually or as a group).<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>What, exactly, is the deepfake phenomenon?<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>A deepfake is an advanced form of digital manipulation of media content, involving the use of machine learning (<em>i.e., <\/em>artificial intelligence) and image generation technologies to create fake audio, photo, or video material that appears authentic and credible. The term \u201cdeepfake\u201d combines the concepts of <em>\u201cdeep <\/em>learning\u201d and <em>\u201cfake<\/em>,\u201d reflecting the very complexity of its sophisticated nature.<\/p>\n<p>The process of creating <em>deepfake<\/em> visual content involves a deep learning algorithm (deep AI) trained on a significant amount of data (photos, video, or audio recordings) related to the target person of the desired content. The algorithm is trained to learn the target person\u2019s facial and vocal characteristics in order to recreate and manipulate any kind of media content\u2014ultimately with the goal of making that person appear to be in a certain place, saying certain words, or performing certain activities that, of course, did not actually happen and do not reflect reality.<\/p>\n<p>There are various techniques used in the process of creating deepfakes, among which we note the generation of images using generative adversarial networks\u2014that is, a pair of neural networks with diametrically opposed objectives, one tasked with generating fake content and the other with detecting fakes. This system thus creates an iterative process through which the quality of the fakes improves via simultaneous positive and negative reinforcement.<\/p>\n<p>Although it may seem like a form of creative entertainment when its purpose is harmless, the <em>deepfake<\/em> phenomenon is overshadowed by a dark cloud of malicious intent, ranging from political manipulation and propaganda to pornographic content (with an alarming percentage of child pornography). According to an analysis by Deeptrace Labs, over 96% of the deepfake content identified online in 2019 was non-consensual pornographic content\u2014where the victims include both public figures and ordinary people, both adults and minors, predominantly women, thereby exacerbating the phenomenon of <em>revenge porn<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>In the political sphere, the dissemination of visual and audio <em>deepfake<\/em> content is capable of creating hysteria, inciting violence, and spreading propaganda more easily than through any other communication channel, particularly on social media platforms\u2014especially given that the tendency to verify the sources of content consumed on these platforms is steadily declining.<\/p>\n<p>For example, <em>deepfake<\/em> images and videos were widely circulated during two highly publicized armed conflicts of our time, namely the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts, generating false political statements attributed to the leaders of these countries (including <strong>(i) <\/strong>Volodymyr Zelensky\u2019s<em> deepfake<\/em> speech in which he ordered Ukrainians to surrender to the Russian army<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> , <strong>(ii) <\/strong><em>deepfake<\/em> content about victims of the Israel-Hamas conflict<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a> , <strong>(iii) <\/strong>Iranian hackers disrupting broadcasts in the UAE with <em>deepfake<\/em> news<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\"><em><strong>[3]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> , and <strong>(iv) <\/strong>the<em> deepfake<\/em> interview with President Vladimir Putin<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a> ).<\/p>\n<p>Although efforts are currently underway to improve countermeasures against the negative effects of <em>deepfake<\/em> content\u2014through the development of technologies to detect this type of content and by attempting to educate the general public in the critical evaluation of falsified media content\u2014such a result is unrealistic at this time.<\/p>\n<p>Given the way information is consumed\u2014particularly the speed at which we actually consume the content we scroll through every day\u2014 on social media platforms designed to deliver dopamine through short, concentrated, and fast-paced content\u2014discerning and filtering the information we consume becomes a utopian concept, especially for Gen Z and subsequent generations, who have not been instilled with the principle of \u201ccheck first, then believe.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, with the delayed identification of <em>deepfake<\/em> content, this type of content has enough time to linger online, spreading false and misleading information, inciting violence, hatred, and racial segregation, as well as destroying the reputations of women who are victims of the wave of <em>deepfake porn<\/em>. By the time such an image or recording is identified as <em>machine-generated<\/em>, the damage has already been done, reputations have been tarnished, and the public has been influenced.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>The European Approach to the Deepfake Phenomenon and National Regulation<\/strong><\/li>\n<li><strong>The European stance<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>At the end of 2022, the European Commission proposed a new directive to combat violence and domestic violence against women in various forms. Currently, the European Council and the European Parliament support the proposal to criminalize, among other things, the non-consensual distribution of AI-generated pornographic content, with the aim of curbing the phenomenon of <em>revenge porn<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>The EU\u2019s response comes in the wake of the most recent <em>deepfake porn <\/em>scandal, in which Taylor Swift herself was the victim earlier this year, with the video garnering over 45 million views online. Since early February, the European Union has proposed criminalizing the distribution of such content within the EU (including <em>revenge porn <\/em>and <em>online harassment<\/em>)\u2014a measure expected to take effect in mid-2027.<\/p>\n<p>European Commission Vice President V\u011bra Jourov\u00e1 told Politico<a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a> that <em>\u201cthe latest repugnant way to humiliate women involves distributing intimate images generated by artificial intelligence in less than a few minutes. Such images can cause serious harm, not just to pop stars, but to any woman who will then be forced to prove at work or at home that those images are the result of deepfakes<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>At the EU level, the European Parliament approved on Wednesday, March 13, 2024, the regulation on artificial intelligence, <strong>the EU AI Act<\/strong>, considered to be <u>the world\u2019s first official regulation of artificial intelligence<\/u>. The European Parliament\u2019s priority is to ensure that AI systems used in the EU are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly. In particular, the aim is for these systems to be supervised by humans\u2014rather than through automated processes themselves\u2014to prevent harmful outcomes resulting from their use. Within the scope of these regulations and future sanctions, the phenomenon of<em> deepfakes<\/em> is also addressed as a component of generative artificial intelligence systems.<\/p>\n<p>We emphasize that the adoption of such a regulation represents a global first, positioning the EU as a leader in establishing a legal framework for artificial intelligence systems, a regulation that will certainly serve as a source of inspiration for non-member countries, particularly the U.S.\u2014where the phenomenon is far more widespread than within the EU.<\/p>\n<p>Final approval will be granted by the Council of the European Union\u2014expected by the end of 2024\u2014and the regulation will enter into force 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal, while the prohibitions and restrictions will take effect 6 months from that date. The application of certain restrictions and bans may be deferred for up to 12 months after the directive enters into force; however, all other obligations set forth in this directive will be enforced, without exception, no later than 36 months after its entry into force, i.e., by the end of 2027 (under current conditions).<\/p>\n<p>The Act regulates different risk categories regarding various artificial intelligence systems, ranging from <strong>unacceptable risk<\/strong>\u2014considered a threat to people and therefore prohibited (<em>i.e.<\/em>, the biometric identification and classification of individuals)\u2014to <strong>high risk<\/strong>\u2014which has a negative impact on people\u2019s safety and fundamental rights and must be assessed before being placed on the market (<em>i.e., <\/em>software for managing migration, asylum, and border control; software that assists in the interpretation and application of the law), and <strong>limited risk<\/strong>\u2014a category that includes general and generative artificial intelligence (<em>i.e., <\/em>ChatGPT; systems that generate and manipulate images, audio, and video content, such as <em>deepfakes<\/em>)<a href=\"#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a> .<\/p>\n<p>However, it is important to note that these rules and classifications were created and drafted three years ago, at a time when applications such as ChatGPT and OpenAI did not have the popularity and prevalence they have today\u2014nor did they possess such learning capabilities and such an extensive database. Given their prevalence, ease of access, and the potential factual and legal implications of this type of output, the classification of generative content systems as \u201clow-risk\u201d may be \u201cupgraded\u201d to a higher risk level over time.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>National Legislative Framework<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>At the national level, however, as early as April 2023, Bill No. 471\/2023 on the responsible use of technology in the context of the deepfake phenomenon was introduced; it is still under review\u2014sent for further report to two committees, with a deadline of March 1, 2024, a deadline that has already passed.<\/p>\n<p>In the explanatory memorandum, the Romanian legislature takes into account the rapid development of technology, artificial intelligence, and techniques for creating artificial virtual reality, as well as the impressive advances in <em>machine learning<\/em> tools, deeming it necessary to intervene to limit the malicious effects of the false content generated by these tools. The legislature also points out that experts in the field consider deepfakes to be far more dangerous and to have a much greater impact than the fake news disseminated in the media to which we are already accustomed, since deepfakes can generate both visual and audio content intrinsically linked to the victim being impersonated.<\/p>\n<p>We therefore welcome the initiative of Representative Eugen Bejinariu and Senator Robert-Marius Cazanciuc, as the sponsors of this bill, and concur with the view expressed regarding the <em>deepfake<\/em> phenomenon\u2014namely, that the creation and distribution of such materials (referred to <strong>as \u201csevere fakes<\/strong>\u201d) constitute\u2014each, in its own material form\u2014a deliberate act, carried out with discernment and direct intent, aimed at harming the victim\u2019s image, reputation, or dignity through the dissemination of misleading and falsified materials that create the appearance of originating directly from the victim or place the victim in scenarios that do not reflect factual, objective reality.<\/p>\n<p>We include, by way of example, the use of<em> deepfake <\/em>technology to portray the President of Romania in a derogatory video, the accuracy of which comes close to mimicking a real video and speech<a href=\"#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a> . We can easily dismiss such content when we assume it is fake and when its very title makes it clear that it was generated by AI software; however, without these assumptions and given the continuous development and refinement of such software, how much longer will we truly be able to distinguish it?<\/p>\n<p>In the form adopted by the Senate, the law provides four articles, including the definition of its scope of application, the definition of the <em>deepfake<\/em> phenomenon, the conditions under which AI-generated material must disclose its nature, and who is responsible for verifying compliance with these legal requirements.<\/p>\n<p>The law defines the <em>\u201cdeepfake\u201d<\/em> phenomenon as <em>\u201cany falsified image, audio, and\/or video content created, as a rule, using artificial intelligence, virtual reality, augmented reality, or other means, such that it creates the appearance that a person has said or done things to which they have not given their consent, and which in reality were not said or done by that person<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The distribution and broadcast of such <em>deepfake<\/em> materials in the media are prohibited <u>unless they are accompanied by a warning displayed on at least 10% of the screen area and throughout the entire duration of the broadcast of the visual content<\/u>, or <u>by an audio message at the beginning and end of the audio content: <em>\u201cThis material contains fictional scenes<\/em><\/u>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Undermining the credibility of previously indisputable evidence<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>What disservice are we truly doing to ourselves by perfecting generative artificial intelligence systems? In terms of evidence, at least until now, imagery (photos or videos) as well as audio and audio-video recordings have been\u2014in both criminal and civil trials\u2014indisputable evidence, evidence whose authenticity was rarely contested, evidence on which we could rely without question.<\/p>\n<p>However, in this surreal context where:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>we can create an omniscient person\u2014who appears in multiple places simultaneously in surveillance footage or photographs;<\/li>\n<li>we can portray an individual in a place, circumstance, or context in which they have never been;<\/li>\n<li>we can generate false testimonies, confessions, and statements\u2014attributed to a person who never made them;<\/li>\n<li>we can manipulate or generate\/fabricate evidence\u2014<em>e., <\/em>alter the content of surveillance footage or images from searches;<\/li>\n<li>we can create events through photos or videos that simulate an event that never happened\u2014which is important for linking persons of interest to an alleged event;<\/li>\n<li>We can defame and discredit any individual by spreading <em>deepfake<\/em> content that depicts them engaging in illegal, scandalous, defamatory, and\u2014most likely\u2014false behavior, ultimately damaging their reputation;<\/li>\n<li>We can discredit witnesses, either by creating content that contradicts their statements or by placing them in other locations in time and space that would make it impossible for them to have been present as witnesses to the events they are testifying about;<\/li>\n<li>we can easily clone and steal identities for the purpose of committing fraud (cyber, banking, financial) by impersonating a real person whom people trust and to whom they will provide personal data;<\/li>\n<li>we can easily violate people\u2019s privacy and harass them online by creating fake profiles with <em>deepfake<\/em> content that portrays the person in question in unrealistic situations capable of damaging their reputation;<\/li>\n<li>we can forge documents by cloning logos and stamps, artificially imitating handwriting styles, or simply making credible alterations to only certain parts of documents, which can ultimately have financial or even criminal implications.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Although such content could be generated in the past, it was far more rudimentary than content developed by artificial intelligence\u2014which is constantly refining its work to perfectly mimic the human element\u2014and the programs were not readily accessible to the general public. Now, with a single Google search\u2014accessible to anyone (including minors)\u2014we can find dozens of software programs available for free or at a minimal cost, where even the most basic and accessible software can generate credible content.<\/p>\n<p>The proliferation of deepfake content is constantly on the rise; the software already available is becoming increasingly sophisticated and user-friendly, making it easy for anyone to generate, in under 30 minutes, content capable of causing serious reputational damage to the chosen victim. Furthermore, unlike news platforms or traditional media, social media platforms do not filter their content through human verification, but rather through bots that are, unfortunately, far too easy to fool.<\/p>\n<p>Social media algorithms can quickly spread (sometimes in a matter of a few hours) <em>deepfake<\/em> material to tens or hundreds of thousands of users, and the support provided by these platforms is slow, with minimal chance of reaching a human representative beyond the support bots. Thus, although the content may be removed after numerous appeals and reports\u2014a process that can take days or even weeks\u2014the deepfake has time to circulate, linger, cause outrage, and quietly poison public opinion, without the pressure of a ticking clock.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, in the context of generative artificial intelligence, which floats freely online and is accessible to anyone who wants it, in the complete absence of a legal framework governing AI tools that would impose limitations or clarify who is actually liable for the harm caused by such content (especially when the author cannot be identified), data protection is expanding its scope to include <u>databases that can access your personal images <\/u>(such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc.).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/artificial-intelligence-hamas-israel-misinformation-ai-gaza-a1bb303b637ffbbb9cbc3aa1e000db47\">Deepfakes from the Gaza War Fuel Fears About AI&#8217;s Ability to Mislead | AP News<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/news.bloomberglaw.com\/artificial-intelligence\/tiktok-videos-reanimating-hamas-victims-spur-deepfake-challenge\">TikTok Struggles to Remove Deepfake Videos of Hamas Victims (bloomberglaw.com)<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u201cThey follow a similar pattern: a tragic death appears in the news, and within a few days or even hours, users post videos featuring a lookalike of that person, recounting how they died. The format of this trend typically includes an introduction from that person\u2019s perspective and a doctored image of them on screen, telling the story of how they died.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/iranian-hackers-interrupt-uae-broadcasts-with-deepfake-news-\/7480126.html\">Iranian Hackers Interrupt UAE Broadcasts With Deepfake News (voanews.com)<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/oecd.ai\/en\/incidents\/8012\">OECD AI Policy Observatory Portal<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\">[5]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-eye-fix-taylor-swift-nude-deepfake\/\">Taylor Swift deepfakes nudge the EU to get real about AI \u2013 POLITICO<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\">[6]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/topics\/ro\/article\/20230601STO93804\/legea-ue-privind-ia-prima-reglementare-a-inteligentei-artificiale\">EU AI Law: The First Regulation on Artificial Intelligence | Topics | European Parliament (europa.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ROfHUXCij-s\">Iohannis: Do You Want to Be a Billionaire? [deepfake] (youtube.com)<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","class_list":["post-57640","legal_developments","type-legal_developments","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments\/57640","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/legal_developments"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=57640"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}