{"id":55862,"date":"2026-05-07T13:34:01","date_gmt":"2026-05-07T13:34:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/?post_type=legal_developments&#038;p=55862"},"modified":"2026-05-07T13:34:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-07T13:34:01","slug":"when-a-prefix-is-not-enough-deceptive-similarity-and-the-essential-feature-doctrine","status":"publish","type":"legal_developments","link":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/thought-leadership\/when-a-prefix-is-not-enough-deceptive-similarity-and-the-essential-feature-doctrine\/","title":{"rendered":"When a Prefix Is Not Enough: Deceptive Similarity and the Essential Feature Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By Himanshu Deora<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>In a significant ruling dated February 10, 2026, the Delhi High Court revisited core principles of trademark law particularly prior use, deceptive similarity, and the essential feature doctrine, in the context of competing marks in the same commercial space.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>The dispute arose from the long-standing use of the mark \u201cARUN\u201d by the petitioner in relation to sewing machines and parts, and the subsequent registration of the mark \u201cAIC ARUN\u201d by a competing entity operating in the same industry and geographical market. The case presented a classic conflict between prior user rights and subsequent registration, requiring the Court to assess whether the addition of a corporate prefix was sufficient to distinguish the marks.<a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/intellectual-property-rights\/deceptive-similarity-essential-feature\/#71198122-93fa-4581-be17-53e0b2a6cc45\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Court ultimately held that the prefix \u201cAIC\u201d did not sufficiently distinguish the impugned mark from the dominant and distinctive element \u201cARUN,\u201d and ordered partial rectification of the register.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Historical Adoption and Statutory Rights in \u201cARUN\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The petitioner established long-standing use of the mark \u201cARUN\u201d dating back to 1962, including through predecessor entities and registered user arrangements. Over time, the mark was also formally registered under the\u00a0<em>Trade Marks Act, 1999<\/em>, consolidating both statutory and common law rights.<\/p>\n<p>While other entities had adopted marks incorporating \u201cARUN,\u201d the petitioner asserted that its use was prior, continuous, and commercially significant, thereby entitling it to protection against confusingly similar marks.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Evidence of Goodwill and Acquired Distinctiveness<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The petitioner substantiated its claim of goodwill and distinctiveness through extensive evidence, including:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Long-standing commercial use spanning several decades;<\/li>\n<li>Newspaper advertisements and cautionary notices issued to trade channels;<\/li>\n<li>Circulars warning against infringement;<\/li>\n<li>Prior enforcement actions against infringers; and<\/li>\n<li>Audited sales figures demonstrating sustained commercial growth.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This evidence supported the conclusion that the mark \u201cARUN\u201d had acquired secondary meaning within the relevant market. Even though \u201cARUN\u201d is a common personal name, the Court reaffirmed that a descriptive or ordinary word can become distinctive through long, exclusive, and continuous use.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Registration of \u201cAIC ARUN\u201d and Rectification Proceedings<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The respondent applied for registration of \u201cAIC ARUN\u201d in 2007, claiming use since 2004. The mark was advertised and subsequently registered in Class 7 for identical goods (sewing machines and parts).<\/p>\n<p>Notably, the Trade Marks Registry had cited the petitioner\u2019s earlier \u201cARUN\u201d marks in its examination report. However, the petitioner did not oppose the application under Section 21 of the\u00a0<em>Trade Marks Act, 1999<\/em>\u00a0at the advertisement stage.<\/p>\n<p>The petitioner later initiated rectification proceedings under Sections 47 and 57, seeking removal or modification of the impugned mark on the ground of deceptive similarity and prior rights.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Defences Raised by the Respondent<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The respondent advanced two principal arguments:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Statutory Validity of Registration:<\/strong>\u00a0The respondent relied on the presumption of validity attached to a registered trademark.<\/li>\n<li><strong>\u201cARUN\u201d as Publici Juris:<\/strong>\u00a0It was contended that \u201cARUN\u201d had become common to the trade (publici juris), and therefore incapable of exclusive appropriation.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The Court rejected the publici juris argument, noting the absence of evidence demonstrating widespread, uncontrolled use of \u201cARUN\u201d in the relevant market. Mere existence of similar marks on the register does not establish that a term has become generic or common to the trade.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Clarification: Publici Juris vs Genericness<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A key correction in legal reasoning is necessary here:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Genericness<\/strong>\u00a0refers to a term that denotes the product itself and is incapable of trademark protection.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Publici juris<\/strong>\u00a0refers to a term commonly used in the trade, which may weaken exclusivity but does not automatically negate protection.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Court correctly applied trademark principles (not copyright law) in holding that dilution of distinctiveness through widespread use must be proven with credible evidence failing which, prior rights prevail.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Deceptive Similarity and the Essential Feature Doctrine<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The central issue before the Court was whether the addition of the prefix \u201cAIC\u201d sufficiently distinguished the mark \u201cAIC ARUN\u201d from \u201cARUN.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Applying the essential feature doctrine, the Court held:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The dominant and distinctive component of the impugned mark was\u00a0<strong>\u201cARUN\u201d<\/strong>;<\/li>\n<li>The prefix \u201cAIC,\u201d being a corporate abbreviation, had minimal distinctiveness;<\/li>\n<li>The visual and phonetic identity of \u201cARUN\u201d remained unchanged.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Court relied on the principle of the average consumer with imperfect recollection, and identified the following factors supporting a likelihood of confusion:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Phonetic identity of the dominant element (\u201cARUN\u201d);<\/li>\n<li>Visual prominence of \u201cARUN\u201d within the composite mark;<\/li>\n<li>Identity of goods (sewing machines and parts);<\/li>\n<li>Overlapping trade channels and consumer base;<\/li>\n<li>Geographic proximity of the parties.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In these circumstances, the Court held that the impugned mark was deceptively similar, and the prefix was insufficient to avoid confusion.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Failure to Oppose vs Right to Rectification<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The respondent argued that the petitioner\u2019s failure to oppose the mark under Section 21 barred subsequent rectification under Sections 47 and 57. The Court rejected this contention and clarified that:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Opposition and rectification are distinct remedies;<\/li>\n<li>Failure to oppose does not create a permanent bar to rectification;<\/li>\n<li>Rectification serves the broader purpose of maintaining the purity of the register.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This position is consistent with established trademark jurisprudence.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Consideration of Precedents<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Court distinguished authorities where marks were held to be common to the trade due to lack of evidence in the present case.<\/p>\n<p>It relied on established principles from cases such as:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd.<\/em>\u00a0(2012)<a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/intellectual-property-rights\/deceptive-similarity-essential-feature\/#922e8d1d-677b-4e7f-81b2-1f1846ec3888\"><sup>2<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<li><em>Greaves Cotton Ltd.<\/em>\u00a0(2011)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>These decisions reiterate that mere addition of prefixes or suffixes to the dominant feature of a mark does not eliminate deceptive similarity.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Exercise of Powers under Section 57<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Instead of cancelling the respondent\u2019s mark in its entirety, the Court exercised its powers under Section 57 to\u00a0<strong>partially rectify the register<\/strong>\u00a0by directing deletion of the word \u201cARUN\u201d from \u201cAIC ARUN.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This nuanced approach:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Preserved the respondent\u2019s ability to continue business under \u201cAIC\u201d;<\/li>\n<li>Prevented misappropriation of the petitioner\u2019s goodwill;<\/li>\n<li>Balanced competing commercial interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Registrar was directed to implement the modification within six weeks.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Key Legal Principles Reinforced<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This decision reaffirms several important principles:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Prior use prevails over subsequent registration, particularly where goodwill is established;<\/li>\n<li>Even common or personal names can acquire distinctiveness through secondary meaning;<\/li>\n<li>The essential feature doctrine remains central to assessing deceptive similarity;<\/li>\n<li>Addition of corporate prefixes or suffixes does not negate infringement;<\/li>\n<li>Failure to oppose does not extinguish the right to seek rectification;<\/li>\n<li>Section 57 empowers courts to order partial rectification to balance equities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Delhi High Court\u2019s decision underscores that trademark protection is rooted in commercial reality, not merely formal registration. While registration confers statutory rights, it does not override the superior rights of a prior user with established goodwill.<\/p>\n<p>By ordering partial rectification, the Court adopted a pragmatic and equitable approach, ensuring both protection of established rights and continuity of legitimate business operations.<\/p>\n<p>The ruling serves as a clear reminder: minor additions such as corporate prefixes cannot legitimise appropriation of the essential feature of an established mark, particularly where such use is likely to cause confusion or dilute accrued goodwill.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>(Case No. C.O.(Comm.IPD-TM) 651\/2022, Judgement No. 2026:DHC:1038),\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/intellectual-property-rights\/deceptive-similarity-essential-feature\/#71198122-93fa-4581-be17-53e0b2a6cc45-link\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<li><em>The Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd.<\/em>, (2013) 53 PTC 1 (Del).\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/intellectual-property-rights\/deceptive-similarity-essential-feature\/#922e8d1d-677b-4e7f-81b2-1f1846ec3888-link\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Authored by\u00a0<b>Himanshu Deora, Partner<\/b> \u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/people\/himanshu-deora\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"><b>https:\/\/ksandk.com\/people\/himanshu-deora\/<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"MoFCFnsqJ1\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/\">King Stubb &#038; Kasiva<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; visibility: hidden;\" title=\"&#8220;King Stubb &#038; Kasiva&#8221; &#8212; King Stubb &amp; Kasiva\" src=\"https:\/\/ksandk.com\/embed\/#?secret=VHP1OFTLoB#?secret=MoFCFnsqJ1\" data-secret=\"MoFCFnsqJ1\" width=\"525\" height=\"296\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","class_list":["post-55862","legal_developments","type-legal_developments","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments\/55862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/legal_developments"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=55862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}