{"id":52872,"date":"2025-10-29T14:53:54","date_gmt":"2025-10-29T14:53:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/?post_type=legal_developments&p=52872"},"modified":"2025-10-29T14:53:54","modified_gmt":"2025-10-29T14:53:54","slug":"supreme-court-recognises-claim-for-damages-for-emotional-stress-short-of-psychiatric-injury-but-not-as-a-personal-injury-claim","status":"publish","type":"legal_developments","link":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/thought-leadership\/supreme-court-recognises-claim-for-damages-for-emotional-stress-short-of-psychiatric-injury-but-not-as-a-personal-injury-claim\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court Recognises Claim For Damages For Emotional Stress Short Of Psychiatric Injury But Not As A \u2018Personal Injury\u2019 Claim"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Supreme Court judgement (of O\u2019Donnell CJ, Dunne J, Hogan J, Murray J and Collins J) in Patrick Dillon v. Irish Life Assurance PLC <\/em>which was handed down on 24th\u00a0 <\/em><\/sup>July 2025, considered whether claims for emotional distress as a result of a data breach falls within the definition of \u2018personal injury\u2019 under the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 and whether obtaining PIAB authorisation to initiate proceedings was required. It found that such a claim did not come within the definition of a \u2018personal injury\u2019 claim. It will be interesting to see the application of this decision going forward to other potential claims in the employment law area.<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Facts: <\/em>The Plaintiff, Patrick Dillon, held a life assurance policy with the Defendant, \u00a0Irish Life. The Defendant issued in error six letters in relation to the Plaintiff\u2019s policy containing \u00a0his personal and financial data between 2008 and 2020 and sent them to a \u00a0third party. The Plaintiff issued proceedings in the Circuit Court alleging that the data breaches were caused by negligence and breach of duty, including breach of statutory duty and caused him \u201cdistress, upset, anxiety, inconvenience, loss and damage\u201d. This was due to the alleged breach by the Defendant of the Data Protection legislation. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff\u2019s claim fell \u00a0within the definition of \u2018personal injury\u2019 within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act 1961 which requires a pre-authorisation from PIAB, which the Plaintiff had not obtained. Also, it argued \u00a0that he should have commenced proceedings by Personal Injuries Civil Bill rather than the Equity Civil Bill in which they were instituted. Both the Circuit Court and the High Court on appeal found that the proceedings sought damages for \u2018personal injury\u2019 and that PIAB authorisation should have been obtained before instituting proceedings and therefore they dismissed his claim.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff the leave to appeal the High Court decision as it considered this case raised issues of general public importance about whether a claim for damages for \u201cdistress, upset and anxiety\u201d arising from a data breach could possibly be seen as a claim for damages for personal injury and the compatibility of PIAB authorisation requirement with EU law.<\/p>\n

Decision: <\/em>In this decision there was two key issues that fell for consideration . One being whether the non-material damage (distress, upset and anxiety) fell within the statutory definition of \u2018personal injury\u2019 as found by the High Court. The second issue being if the Plaintiff\u2019s claim is a form of \u2018personal injury\u2019 , whether a requirement to apply to PIAB for pre-authorisation \u00a0would render it extensively difficult for the plaintiff to exercise his rights to compensation for non-material damage under the GDPR in breach of the EU Directive.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court judgement delves into the statutory and common law definition of the term \u2018personal injury\u2019. This judgment highlights that in relation to the various statutory definitions:<\/p>\n

\u2018it is easy to lose sight of the fact that while the definition of \u2018personal injury\u2019 used in these statutes is comprehensive, in none of them does it purport to be of general application. It is instead used for various distinct, related but quite specific purposes.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n

The Court also refers to the case of Clark v O\u2019Gorman<\/em> where it was held that a personal injury action is not a claim in which standalone damages are sought to compensate for distress and anxiety.<\/p>\n

Mr. Justice Brian Murray held that the Plaintiff\u2019s claim in negligence was misconceived as he cannot obtain damages in negligence for mental distress that falls short of a psychiatric injury. However, he held that the Plaintiff had a standalone claim for non-material damage pursuant to the unique claim set out in Section 117 of the Data Protection Acts. He also held that where a plaintiff\u2019s claims are solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety that the plaintiff cannot expect anything other than very, very modest awards.<\/p>\n

Takeaway for Employers: <\/em>The Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Dillon v Irish Life Assurance Plc<\/em> is important to note where claims for emotional upset, distress, or anxiety without a recognised psychiatric illness do not qualify as personal injury but also illustrates where such claims may still proceed in respect of certain statutory obligations. While this decision specifically related to the breach of GDPR and the remedy provided for in that legislation, it will be interesting to see if the decision will be applied to other statutory remedies where there is non-material damage such as under the Protected Disclosures Acts or under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Acts.<\/p>\n

Link:<\/em> https:\/\/www2.courts.ie\/view\/judgments\/56f5ca9a-b457-4cc2-b47d-430d66ec47d2\/94687f75-3845-4430-be87-9699d49b9460\/2025_IESC_37.pdf\/pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

Authors \u2013 Anne O\u2019Connell & <\/em>Abigail Ansell<\/p>\n

18 September 2025<\/p>\n

AOC Solicitors<\/p>\n

19-22 Baggot Street Lower<\/p>\n

Dublin 2<\/p>\n

www.aocsolicitors.ie<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","class_list":["post-52872","legal_developments","type-legal_developments","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments\/52872","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/legal_developments"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=52872"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}