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In Turkey, non-complete obligations may be evaluated under the scope of "agreements that restrict competition" or "abusive conducts of dominant undertakings" (Article 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054 on Protection of Competition ("Law No. 4054"), akin to Article 101 and 102 of TFEU, respectively).
Per the general application of the effects theory, transactions that do not directly or indirectly impact Turkish markets are outside the scope of the Turkish merger control regime. The Turkish Competition Board (" Board ") applied the effects theory in some of its decisions regarding highly exceptional foreign-to-foreign transactions. However, the precedent line of the Board suggests that a mandatory merger control filing will be required, as long as the parties exceed the turnover threshold applicable under Article 7 of Communiqué No. 2010/4 on the Mergers and Acquisitions Subject to the Approval of the Competition Board (" Communiqué No.2010/4 "), regardless of whether the contemplated post-transaction entity will have operations and/or generate turnover in Turkey. This interpretation of the effects theory and the Board's current understanding of this concept are closely related to the notifiability of foreign-to-foreign transactions with extremely low or even no effects in Turkey.
There has been a new amendment to the recent legislative proposal ("Proposal") on amendment to the Law No. 5651 on Regulation of Broadcasts via Internet and Prevention of Crimes Committed through Such Broadcasts ("Law No. 5651"), which is known as "Internet Law". The amended Proposal is submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly ("TGNA") on January 23, 2015.
Online sales numerous advantages have rendered them increasingly popular during the past years. The internet, due to its unique characteristics, provides companies with an enlarged geographic scope, thus enabling them to promote their products widely, avoiding, at the same time, the operational costs of a brick and mortar shop. From the customers' perspective, it enhances consumers' variety of choice and their ability to virtually compare prices from several stores.
With the execution of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the increasing enforcement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), multinational companies are more aware of the consequences of corrupt behavior than ever. Due to historically high fines imposed for corrupt behavior, compliance is of crucial concern for companies. This becomes an even bigger issue, when a company begins to conduct business in emerging markets. This is because, emerging markets may be more risky for anti-corruption risks due to the difference in anti-corruption laws and perceptions. Therefore, the adoption of a compliance program and engaging in rigorous third party due diligence as a part of this compliance program becomes mandatory for multinational companies active in emerging markets.
I. Introduction to Construction for Allotment Agreements A. Definition and Elements In practice, especially in Turkey, there are numerous types of construction agreements relying on various terms and principles by virtue of the " freedom of contract " principle governing law of obligations. Construction for allotment agreement is the most common one among agreements that diverges from traditional construction agreements.  On that note, a traditional construction agreement can be specified as an agreement, pursuant to which the contractor undertakes to construct a specific structure whereas the client undertakes to pay a certain amount in consideration thereto.
Growing economy and competitive environment in Turkey has been leading companies to seek more profitable ways to conduct their business. Therefore companies have chosen to engage in subcontracts for the purpose of reducing their costs. Yet, to serve such purpose, at some point companies have started utilizing subcontracts to limit employees' entitlements through collusive contracts. Labor Law numbered 4857 (the " Labor Law ") and Bylaw on Subcontractor dated September 27, 2008 (the " Bylaw ") regulate which services or works may be subcontracted and strictly prohibit collusive contracts. According to Article 2/7 of the Labor Law, a collusive subcontract is considered null and void. Such nullity of subcontract automatically results in primary employers being redefined as main and sole employers of employees assigned to subcontracted work. Consequently, primary employers are solely responsible for employees' rights arising from subcontracted works and technically, primary employers would not have the option to recourse to subcontractors in order to claim any compensation due to their sole responsibility.
Boundaries of the Turkish Competition Authority's Investigative Powers: Case Handlers vs. Personal Property
The acquisition of a minority shareholding may come under the Turkish Competition Authority's (" Authority ") scrutiny in two ways, mainly: 1) it may result in de facto or de jure sole or joint control, depending on the rights possessed by the minority shareholders and/or shareholding structures and past voting patterns; and 2) it may not result in control but in cross-shareholding structures amongst competitors in a concentrated market which may raise questions about coordinated effects. This article discusses the circumstances under which the abovementioned consequences may arise under Turkish competition law with references to the relevant legislation and the most noteworthy cases in this regard.